The pricing policy of Bulgarian manufacturing firms is analysed in the paper in the context of the theory of the price-setting behaviour of firms endowed with market power, and more specifically, using the notion of mark-up pricing. Using some recent derivations in the literature, we estimate mark-up ratios for Bulgarian manufacturing sectors at the NACE 2-digit and NACE 3-digit levels. The estimated mark-ups are then tested against a set of variables measuring the degree of competitive pressure on a sectoral level. 
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
The pricing behaviour of Bulgarian manufacturing firms is analyzed in the paper in the context of the theory of the price-setting behaviour of firms endowed with market power, more specifically, using the notion of mark-up pricing. Under perfect competition and assuming perfect markets, producers will sell their products in accordance with their marginal costs. Conversely, deviation from perfect competition and/or perfect markets can be identified by the discrepancy between prices and marginal costs. In the case when the demand curve is downward sloping, this shift results in the formation of a price mark-up, i.e., a situation when the equilibrium price exceeds marginal cost.
Using some recent derivations in the literature (in particular, Roeger's (1995) extension of Hall's (1988) original approach), we estimate mark-up ratios for Bulgarian manufacturing sectors at the NACE 2-digit and NACE 3-digit levels. We use for this purpose balance sheet data for Bulgarian manufacturing enterprises for the period 1995-1997. The estimated numerical values of the mark-up ratios compare favourably with similar results for other countries.
The mark-up ratio reflects the pricing policy of firms endowed with market power who use that power to set prices higher than their marginal costs. Looked from the opposite angle, if the mark-up ratios are measurable, then they themselves can be regarded as reflecting the degree of competition that firms are facing on the market. To test this conjecture, we formulate and estimate a "mark-up price equation" which seeks to explain the cross-sector variation in mark-up ratios through variables measuring competitive pressure within manufacturing sectors. The estimated mark-up equations in the main provide evidence supporting the conjecture that the stronger market competition is a conducive environment for efficient price setting. At the same time, some ambiguity remains as regards the impact of some competition-related variables (such as ownership and exposure to external markets) on the pricing policies of Bulgarian manufacturing firms.
Introduction
The existence of competitive markets is an essential prerequisite for productive efficiency and a fundamental requirement for the efficient allocation of resources in the economy; competitive pressure is also a major driving force for innovation at the firm level.
The fact that firms in the centrally planned economy operated in the absence of competitive pressure was one of the main factors that contributed for the emergence of built-in allocative and productive inefficiencies (x-inefficiency) and for the generally inefficient resource allocation in these economies. Thus a large part of the legislative, regulatory and institutional reforms initiated and implemented in the CEECs during the past decade were aimed at the creation of a competitive market environment. This was an essential component of the policy effort seeking to enhance the restructuring of enterprise and improve their productive efficiency.
The start of the transition from plan to market in the CEECs in general was featured (although to a varying degree in the different countries) by non-competitive markets, in virtually all aspects outlined above. Market structures were dominated by large, state-owned firms that used to enjoy monopolistic or close to a monopolistic position on the local markets.
The degree of openness of the economies was limited, creating a cushion that shielded local firms from competition from abroad. Local product and factor markets were in a rudimentary state, with prevailing state control over domestic prices. Both entry and exit barriers were overwhelming with very little, if any, room left for entrepreneurial activity. All these, in turn, cemented the market power of the large local firms. The prevailing governance structure was that of linear subordination to the central authorities while managerial incentives in the main were dominated by the principles of the command economy.
Although enterprise restructuring was one of the areas of intense research, Relatively few studies have analyzed the firms' pricing behaviour during the transition. Under perfect competition, the equilibrium on the goods market is established when the trading prices equal the firms' marginal costs (put differently, this implies that firms adjust their cost structure so that to set their marginal costs equal to the exogenous price level). However, in the absence of perfect competition, there may be deviations from this model of cost and price formation. Carlin et al. (1999) , on the basis of enterprise surveys, find some evidence of a positive correlation between innovation and price mark-up but only in the case of new entrants to the market.
Pricing behaviour under imperfect competition: Hall's approach and Roeger's transformation
Under perfect competition and assuming perfect markets, producers will sell their products in accordance with their marginal costs. 1 Conversely, deviation from perfect competition and/or perfect markets can be identified by the discrepancy between prices and marginal costs. Hence, relaxing the assumption of perfect market competition allows to analyze different pricing behaviour and policies of the firms. One of the theoretical models of price formation under the assumption of the existence of monopolistic or oligopolistic market structure is that of "mark-up" pricing (Eichner, 1973; Lavoie, 1996) . As known from theory, the presence of a monopolist endowed with market power may result in the shifting of the equilibrium point from the position of perfect competition. In the case when the demand curve is downward sloping, this shift results in the formation of a price mark-up, i.e., a situation when the equilibrium price exceeds marginal cost. In other words, if the market structure is characterized by the incidence of monopolistic/oligopolistic firms, the latter may use their market power to set prices higher than their marginal costs, that is to establish a "mark-up" over the marginal costs:
(1) p = θ µ where p is product price, µ is marginal cost and θ is the mark-up ratio (θ > 1).
As well known from theory, the mark-up ratio of a profit-maximizing monopolistic firm facing a downward sloping demand curve, is derived in the following form:
where η is the price elasticity of demand.
Mark-up pricing can also be described by the so-called Lerner index:
By virtue of the above definitions:
Looked from a different perspective, the mark-up ratio can be regarded as a forwardlooking measure of the degree of competition that firms are facing on the market. Thus Hall (1988) , starting from the assumption that price mark-ups emerge as a result of market power, analyzes the implications of market power on productive efficiency, factor demand and pricing behaviour. For this purpose he derives the Solow residual in the case of imperfect competition and/or markets, when product price does not necessarily equal marginal cost.
Hall shows that in this case the difference between the rate of growth of nominal output and the weighted average of factor inputs is not solely attributed to autonomous technical change but may partly reflect monopolistic pricing policy.
This approach is illustrated in the following framework. Assume that output is defined by a standard neo-classical Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale:
where K j and L j stand for capital and labour inputs, accordingly and T j is a measure of productive efficiency.
As known, profit maximization yields:
where s wj is the share of labour costs in the total firm's costs.
From (5) and (6), the Solow residual which reflects the rate of change of total factor productivity (denoted below as s j ) in the case of perfect competition takes the well known form of:
where small letters stand for logarithms and "d" denotes the (logarithmic) differences approximating growth rates.
In Hall's (1988) approach, the firm operates under imperfect competition and prices deviate from marginal costs; he shows that in this case the Solow residual computed as (7) can also be decomposed into:
where B is the above mentioned Lerner index.
In turn, Roeger (1995) , using the dual cost function, has derived a similar expression for the dual, or price based Solow residual s* j :
where P j , W j and R j denote firm's price, labour and capital costs, small letters stand for logarithms and "d" for the logarithmic differences
He then subtracts (9) from (8) in which operation the last terms of the two right hand expressions containing the efficiency term cancel out, and after some manipulation and adding an error term, a simple expression is obtained which is at the same time very convenient for estimation:
The sums in each of the small brackets are nothing else than the logarithmic differences of the corresponding nominal values:
where Y* j , L* j and K* j denote the nominal values of value added, labour and capital costs, accordingly and the small letters -their logarithms.
Denoting:
the final expression for the estimable equation becomes:
Another appealing feature in Roeger's transformation is that both prices and real variables disappear in the final expressions and so this approach allows to estimate the markup ratios directly from the nominal enterprise data without requiring the knowledge of enterprise or sectoral prices. Also it overcomes the identification problems mentioned by Hall (1988) which arise from the correlation between the explanatory variable and the error term.
Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) have developed further Roeger's transformation to apply for a production function defined over sales and incorporating material inputs as well.
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For example, assume a Cobb-Douglas production function of the type:
where Z j , K j MC j and L j stand for real sales, capital, material inputs and labour inputs, accordingly and T j is the measure of productive efficiency.
Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) show that in this case the corresponding expressions for v* j and q* j will take the form:
where Z* j , K* j MC* j and L* j stand for nominal sales, capital, material and labour costs, accordingly, while the small letters stand for their logarithms and "d" for the logarithmic difference; α = s wj ; β = s mj are the shares of labour costs and of material costs in total costs, In this case the derived estimable equation retains its form. Roeger (1995) and further studies by Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) and Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999) have used the above transformation to estimate sectoral mark-up ratios on the basis of longitudal sectoral data (time series of aggregated sectoral data). In principle, data allowing (at least two subsequent observations are needed in order to compute the log-differences), there are no theoretical constraints on the application of the above approach to pooled latitudal enterprise data (cross-section), or to mixed enterprise data (panel data). Moreover, this allows in addition to ease one of the possibly rigid assumptions of Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) , incorporated also in all further empirical studies, namely that the mark-ups are time-invariable. In principle, by using cross-sectional data, it is possible to compute mark-up ratios for each available data point.
Estimation of the mark-up ratios for Bulgarian manufacturing firms
We applied Roeger's transformation to estimate the mark-up ratios in Bulgarian manufacturing by NACE 3-digit and NACE 2-digit sectors, on the basis of the available enterprise data set. We used the extension suggested by Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) corresponding to the mark-up ratios pertaining to sales (implying a production function which is defined over gross output and incorporating material inputs), which seems to be less prone to estimation bias.
We use for this purpose balance sheet data for Bulgarian manufacturing enterprises for the period 1995-1997, as reported to the National Statistical Institute (NSI). An overview of the full sample of Bulgarian manufacturing firms reported by the NSI, broken down by NACE 2-digit sectors, is shown in table 1. This sample is only restricted to firms that apply the "double entry" book accounting standard as only this provides sufficiently detailed breakdown of performance indicators (as needed for our analysis).
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Firms in table 1 are defined as private if a majority stake was in private ownership as of the end of the corresponding year (these include both privatized and newly formed private firms); the rest are defined as SOEs.
The estimation procedure is pretty straightforward. First v* j and q* j are calculated for each enterprise as shown in (15) and (16) from the individual enterprise data for two adjacent periods. As noted above, only nominal (current price) data are needed for this operation.
Then equation (13) is estimated, by selected categories of firms such as manufacturing sectors or another pre-selected sub-set of enterprises. The estimated coefficient of the q* variable is nothing else than the implied Lerner index. Afterwards, we can calculate backwards the sectoral mark-up ratios θ i as shown in (4).
This procedure implies homogeneity of the production technology across the sub-sets of firms for which equation (13) is estimated, and the final result is the average mark-up over marginal cost defined for this pre-specified category of firms. Due to the implications of eventual non-homogeneity of the implied production technology across firms, it is preferable to perform sectoral estimations at a lower level of sectoral disaggregation where it is more likely that this condition would be observed. On the other hand, the sheer number of firms for which data are available becomes a binding lower constraint because already at the NACE 3-digit level there are sectors which are rather under-represented in terms of the number of firms.
Taking into account these conflicting considerations, the above procedure has been applied in two sets of estimations: The available data only allow to perform these estimations from 1995 onwards and due to the fact that two adjacent years are needed to estimate the mark-ups in one year, this has reduced the time period to two years: 1996 and 1997. Accordingly, the estimations of equation (15) have been performed separately for each of these years and for a two-year panel.
Due to the implied relationship with the elasticity of demand (2), the mark-up ratio only has a meaningful and straightforward economic interpretation in the case when it is > 1.
As can be seen in the results shown in tables 2 and 3, this has not always been the case in the The results presented in table 3 allow a comparison of the pricing policy of SOEs and private firms (as noted, due to the limited number of firms, such a breakdown could only be made at the NACE 2-digit level). Notably, these results do not indicate any systematic deviations in the pricing patterns of these two categories of firms. This is a somewhat counterintuitive finding, as in the transition literature it has usually been taken for granted that SOEs (especially large enterprises) are more likely to enjoy a monopolistic position on the domestic market. Consequently, assuming that SOEs tend to engage more often in monopolistic mark-up pricing practices one would expect to find higher mark-up ratios for the sub-set of SOE than for the sub-set of private firms. In contrast, our results do not provide any systematic evidence of this happening. There are indeed cases when the computed sectoral mark-ups are higher than those of the private firms but there are also the examples of the opposite happening.
Competitive pressure and mark-up pricing
As noted above, by its theoretical definition, the mark-up ratio reflects the pricing policy of firms endowed with market power who use that power to set prices higher than their marginal costs. Hence, looked from the opposite angle, if the mark-up ratios are measurable, then they themselves can be regarded as reflecting the degree of competition that firms are facing on the market. In terms of the empirical statistics used in the framework of our study, such a conjecture would at least imply a positive statistical association between the measured sectoral marukps and the measures of sectoral competitive pressure.
To test this conjecture, we formulate and estimate a "mark-up price equation" which seeks to explain the cross-sector variation in mark-up ratios through variables measuring competitive pressure within manufacturing sectors. Admittedly, in the absence of a proper structural model such an approach has limited analytical power as it is not backed by underlying structural relationships and hence the estimated relationships can only be interpreted in their statistical sense. At the same time such an approach may provide some further clues both as to the overall consistency of the approach and to the adequacy and proper measurement of the mark-ups.
The idea is then to specify the "mark-up price equation" in a form that would allow to analyze (and judge) whether competitive pressure/market power within sectors has a statistically meaningful effect on the price formation in the sectors (as reflected by the computed mark-ups) and if yes, which are the main factors that affect the level of the markups. For this purpose we use as dependent variable the estimated in the previous step markup ratios which should in principle reflect the average addition to marginal costs charged by the firms within individual sectors. As to the independent variables, we use a set of competition variables described below.
We therefore specify a sectoral mark-up price equation for sector i as follows:
where the following competition variables are used: In general, the estimation results for the mark-up price equation presented in table 4 can be regarded as satisfactory in terms of the measured direction of impact. The concentration variable was estimated with a negative sign (again counter to the expected) but the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient is low (only for the full sample panel it is significant at the 10% level). The coefficient of the import penetration variable is always positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level). In terms of the argument above, this would suggest that foreign firms operating on the domestic market tend to enjoy substantial market power which allows them to set monopolistic prices while local firms follow suit.
The coefficient of the debt variable is always estimated with a positive sign (in conformity with expectations) and is also statistically significant. This could be interpreted as evidence that financial pressure (and the implied soft budget constraints) is associated with pricesetting practices similar to the monopolistic ones.
As to the variables reflecting export activity and the ownership effect, in most cases the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant while the signs vary in the different versions. In line with expectation, in most cases the estimated coefficients of the ownership variable are positive and for 1997 they are also statistically significant, implying that SOEs firms in that year were more likely to engage in monopolistic price-setting practices.
However, most of the coefficients of the ownership variable are not statistically significant, so the estimation results do not provide strong empirical support for this type of argument.
As regards the export variable, in more cases this coefficient is negative, but its statistical significance is very low.
Conclusions
The competition literature argues strongly that when firms are subject to growing competitive pressure, they are motivated to seek ways to enhance their allocative and productive efficiency. Theory also suggests that a competitive environment in well functioning markets is not only propitious for the firms' productive and allocative efficiency but also contributes to the establishment of efficient price-setting mechanisms which are beneficial for consumers as well. Competitive pricing and efficiency are in fact the two sides of one and the same coin.
The transition from plan to market provides an excellent testing ground to test the validity of some of these assumptions and theoretical derivations as the local firms have been facing growing competitive pressures due to the liberalization and opening up of these economies. In this paper we attempted to address empirically some aspects of the ongoing process of enterprise restructuring and adjustment in Bulgaria focusing on the impact of competitive pressure on the pricing policies of Bulgarian manufacturing firms.
The pricing policy of Bulgarian manufacturing firms was analyzed in the paper in the context of the theory of the price-setting behaviour of firms endowed with market power, and more specifically, using the notion of mark-up pricing. Using some recent derivations in the literature, we estimate mark-up ratios for Bulgarian manufacturing sectors at the NACE 2-digit and NACE 3-digit levels. These estimates have empirical value in themselves, as this aspect of the pricing policy of firms in the transition economies has not been elaborated sufficiently in the literature.
As the sectoral mark-up ratios should reflect the degree of competition that firms are facing within each sector, the paper then goes to test the estimated mark-ups against a set of variables measuring the degree of competitive pressure on a sectoral level. Again, the estimated mark-up equations in the main provide evidence supporting the conjecture that the stronger market competition is a conducive environment for efficient price setting. At the same time, some ambiguity remains as regards the impact of some competition-related variables (such as ownership and exposure to external markets) on the pricing policies of Bulgarian manufacturing firms. 
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